I spent the month of October 2018 in Japan doing research in archives but also meeting veterans of Imphal and the families of veterans.
I also visited the Museum of Special Operations at Chiran in the south near Nagasaki. Special Operations refers to what in the west is call the Kamakaze programme. Kamakaze is a word Japanese never use in relation to the programme. My main take away was that the programme was very costly in terms of pilots, obviously. In the early days when the pilots were new recruits it made more sense than towards the end when even flying instructors were going on missions. The greatest number of missions were during the Battle of Okinawa which was of course the Japanese homeland even if not the mainland. There was also an air assault special operation in which 18, as I recall, paratroopers landed on a US airfield and destroyed aircraft until they were all killed.
I spent lots of time in the archive supported by excellent translators and a few Japanese historians who helped. I also filmed an interview with Takao-san a veteran of Imphal. He was a battalion commander’s runner in 214 Regiment ie on the southern Tiddim Road axis. His unit got as close to Imphal as any Japanese Unit. Again no spoilers but he spoke about condensed milk in the container dropped for Allied troops.
He also said they liked fighting the British who were complete gentlemen and best of all mostly slept at night. Whereas, he said Japanese officers had them running around fruitlessly at night. From what I know this rings true. He said much more that was fascinating.
I was also able to fill in a good deal of detail on the Japanese axis on Shenam Ridge which for a period was their main effort. The Commander there, Major Gen Yamamoto was the so called Infantry Commander in 33 Division. Normally, the infantry commander in a Japanese division would command the contact battle from a forward tactical headquarters while the Divisional Commander commanded the whole Division from Main Headquarters. At Imphal 33 Division was split onto two axis, Kabaw Valley and Tiddim Road and there was almost no movement between each axis. It was thus two completely seperate battles. Yamamoto was much keener on the whole Imphal plan than the other Divisional commanders including his own, and of course he had a road along the Kabaw Valley along which supplies could be brought to him. His force, was put under the direct commander of 15th Army and then apparently Burma Area Army although I still want to verify this.
The veterans families were angry with “Mutaguchi and anyone who listened to him” which of course meant the chain of command right up to Prime Minister Tojo. There are two sources of anger. One that such a poorly planned operation was allowed to go ahead in the first place given its low chance of success. On this point I am sympathetic to Mutaguchi and Kawabe in Burma Area Army. They had few good choices and Japanese doctrine of the time was clear that when you were threatened with attack, you did not defend; you attacked. The second point of anger for veterans is the Battle went on long after it was clear it had failed. Since most of the Japanese casualties occurred in the second half ie after 1 April 1944. This is harder to defend not least since by May and June it was Tokyo and Singapore who were asking for one last effort. BAA badly needed the troops in northern Burma were the front was in danger of collapsing as a result of Chinese attacks.
Other highlights of my visit include
- Slim/Scoones made a significant planning mistake and was lucky that 20 Division was not trapped at the same time as 17th.
- Half of the ammunition intended for Kohima was lost to allies air and Chindits. Also, a Japanese regiment was left behind from the Imphal assault to counter Chindits. All told I am not sure the Chindits get the credit they were due.
- Spare a thought for the Japanese soldier sent back to Army Headquarters to get the gift of tobacco from the Emperor for the attacking troops. He also given a bottle of Sake but this was for the officers and of course breakable. In the carnage and confusion of the Chindwin crossings, somewhere in there was this soldier nursing the Sake trying to get back to his unit with it in tact.
So much more to say. Must keep writing. Do follow this blog or better still analysishistory on facebook or instagram.
