Analysis History seeks to inform the present. There are lots of revolutions to study including Iran 1979.
Revolutions are all ascribed a date but in fact take a long time (30 years). This Iranian (counter ?) revolution has some way to go before it can topple a strong security apparatus. History suggests that regimes who are prepared to shoot their own citizens hang on. Iran has multiple layers of enforcers, including Shia militias from Iraq, which gives it greater security resilience.
Iran is a patriarchy. In the past the regime has proved effective in leaning on the ‘heads’ of families who then kept the young at home. This unrest is different but an efficient intelligence apparatus will make its move against organisers. The organisers, if there are any, will want to be sure the old regime will indeed fail before they resist such pressure. The transition from spontaneous protest to organised resistance is very risky for the insurgent.
So what follows? Historical precedent is grim here. Removal is one thing but replacement is another. There are no obvious candidates. You would not have bet on the Bolsheviks even as late as July 1917, but they were organised and armed early, so they won. In 1979 in Iran the islamists had a huge advantage of organisation, religious legitimacy and daily access to the people. (Iranians wanted a revolution in 1979 but they did not ask for an Islamic one – discounting the referendum in which 96% (!?) affirmed an islamist outcome). So who is a potential successor. As soon as one appears the regime can move against them and if none appear the regime will try to hang on. I suspect the forces of the status quo are strong.
Iranians are proud and nationalistic with history to match. Many are anti-American as well as Islamic-regime sceptics. Thus, Trump’s support is probably a poison chalice.
We tend to see Iranians as pro liberal or pro regime ie a bit black and white. Equally, Iran consists of familial, networks coalescing around sectoral commercial interests each with representatives in the regime; both secular and religious. In short, there are many players and outcomes. It just might be that the commercial interests of these groups no longer support the status quo but they will only move when they can be sure to win. One outcome might be relatively subtle shift back to the secular organs of government which were largely ignored by the islamic component.
Revolutions are all ascribed a date but in fact take a long time (30 years). This Iranian (counter ?) revolution has some way to go before it can topple a strong security apparatus. History suggests that regimes who are prepared to shoot their own citizens hang on. Iran has multiple layers of enforcers, including Shia militias from Iraq, which gives it greater security resilience.
Iran is a patriarchy. In the past the regime has proved effective in leaning on the ‘heads’ of families who then kept the young at home. This unrest is different but an efficient intelligence apparatus will make its move against organisers. The organisers, if there are any, will want to be sure the old regime will indeed fail before they resist such pressure. The transition from spontaneous protest to organised resistance is very risky for the insurgent.
So what follows? Historical precedent is grim here. Removal is one thing but replacement is another. There are no obvious candidates. You would not have bet on the Bolsheviks even as late as July 1917, but they were organised and armed early, so they won. In 1979 in Iran the islamists had a huge advantage of organisation, religious legitimacy and daily access to the people. (Iranians wanted a revolution in 1979 but they did not ask for an Islamic one – discounting the referendum in which 96% (!?) affirmed an islamist outcome). So who is a potential successor. As soon as one appears the regime can move against them and if none appear the regime will try to hang on. I suspect the forces of the status quo are strong.
Iranians are proud and nationalistic with history to match. Many are anti-American as well as Islamic-regime sceptics. Thus, Trump’s support is probably a poison chalice.
We tend to see Iranians as pro liberal or pro regime ie a bit black and white. Equally, Iran consists of familial, networks coalescing around sectoral commercial interests each with representatives in the regime; both secular and religious. In short, there are many players and outcomes. It just might be that the commercial interests of these groups no longer support the status quo but they will only move when they can be sure to win. One outcome might be relatively subtle shift back to the secular organs of government which were largely ignored by the islamic component.